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Abstract. Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contra-
dicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to
deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs
of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the aﬀected regions. Within a simple
framework which diﬀerentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist
and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions
to anti-terrorism policies, it is argued here that undiﬀerentiated deterrence may
indeed backﬁre, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A
very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be
the most reasonable remaining approach.
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There is a large number of economic approaches to the problem of terrorism that
treat the individual decision to engage in terrorist activities as a rational choice cal-
culus, which is largely in line with empirical evidence. For example, the data show
that terrorist activities decrease with the severity and likelihood of prison sentences
and with the effectiveness of the technology used to prevent terrorist acts (Landes
1978). And even if one is not willing to attribute individual rationality to each and
every suicide bomber, one can still argue that the leaders of terrorist groups who
guide and encourage the suicide bombers are rational individuals, so that the phe-
nomenon of terrorism as a whole remains a reasonable subject for rational choice
approaches (Rathbone and Rowley 2002).
Sandler and Enders (2004: 302) deﬁne terrorism as “the premeditated use, or threat
of use, of extranormal violence to obtain a political objective through intimidation
or fear directed at a large audience”. Until recently, there appears to have been
a consensus that the political objectives that are assumed to appear in the utility
function of terrorists are more or less “constructive” goals, such as establishing
political independence for a region or an ethnic group, demanding the release of
fellow terrorists from imprisonment, or promoting one’s own faith and ideology.
If that is the case and terrorists are indeed rational, the amount of terrorist activity
conducted by one speciﬁc group may be reduced by seeking a political compromise
with that group – although, of course, the problem exists that in the longer run
1terrorism may then be perceived as a feasible strategy by other political groups,
which again would lead to an increase of terrorist activities. In conﬂicts such as
the struggle between Irish republican catholics and protestant Ulster loyalists, the
attempt to decrease terrorist activity by seeking political compromise has certainly
led to a decline of terrorist activity.
On the other hand, the kidnapping of German politician Peter Lorenz by the Red
Army Fraction in 1975, which has been peacefully resolved by exchanging Lorenz
for imprisoned members of the terrorist group, is an example for a compromise that
has motivated further attempts by terrorists to emulate this once-successful strategy.
This is consistent with the game-theoretic insight that only a strict non-negotiating
policy will deter terrorists from attempting extortions (Lapan and Sandler 1988,
Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley 1983, Selten 1988) and only in the case that at-
tempting extortion does not involve other sources of utility, e.g. a reputational
utility from decapitating the hostage if negotations fail.
Recently, the argument has been made by different authors that islamic terrorism as
we observe it today is not directed at enforcing “constructive” goals, but rather of
a purely destructive or nihilist nature. This paper differs from other recent contri-
butions to the economics of terrorism in assuming that there is a kind of terrorism
which is not undertaken to achieve feasible political goals through extortion (as
recently assumed by Frey and Luechinger 2003 as well as Konrad 2002) but which
aims purely at producing damage to a perceived enemy, or as Plaut (2004) puts
it: “terrorists seek to achieve the annihilation of their targets, not a negotiated
2solution”. Section 2 argues that the phenomenon of nihilist terrorism is indeed
of empirical relevance, and not only with regard to islamist terrorism. In Section
3 it is argued that efforts to seek political compromise with nihilist terrorists or
to offer them alternatives to careers in terrorism are likely to be futile or even
counter-productive. In Section 4, however, an argument based upon the economics
of reciprocity is made that conventional deterrence against terrorists has also the
potential to evoke an increase of nihilist terrorism. Finally, Section 5 offers some
conclusions.
2. NIHILISM AS A FEATURE OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
The Merriam Webster dictionary deﬁnes nihilism as a “doctrine or belief that
conditions in the social organization are so bad as to make destruction desirable
for its own sake independent of any constructive program or possibility”. But
can the seemingly uncompromised taste for destruction shared, for example, by
suicide bombers really be attributed to nihilism or is the terrorist act merely an
instrument to achieve other, constructive purposes? Bernholz (2004) has introduced
the notion of supreme values into the economic discussion of terrorism, reasoning
that terrorists tend to have lexicographic preferences where the achievement of one
primary purpose or the worshipping of a dominant ideology is more important than
any other possible argument in the terrorist’s utility function. For an individual with
completely lexicographic preferences of this kind, there is no trade-off between
consuming ordinary private or public goods on the one hand and becoming a
3terrorist on the other hand. If he or she does indeed feel obliged to honour his or
her supreme values, the individual is willing to sacriﬁce his or her career, income
or even life if he or she believes that this is instrumental in achieving the primary
purpose.
In such a framework, even suicide terrorism is not paradoxical per se from a
rational choice perspective – it is simply the manifestation of a very odd set of
individual preferences. There does, however, exist the problem that terrorist acts
often are ill-suited to achieve the primary purposes that are usually attributed to
individuals who engage in terrorist activity. It is, for example, quite clear that Israel
will accept an independent state of Palestine only if the Palestinian side abstains
from terrorist activity, or as the so-called Roadmap puts it: “A two state solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict will only be achieved through an end to violence
and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively
against terror [...]”. If the aim of Palestinian terrorism was indeed to establish
an independent state of Palestine, sustaining terrorist threats would obviously
be counter-productive. However, a look at the internal charter of the Islamic
Jihad movement (see Hatina 2001) shows that not so much the establishment
of a Palestinian state is the primary purpose of this organisation, but the mere
existence of the state of Israel on what is perceived to be arab soil is considered
as unacceptable. Obviously, a rational jihadist cannot seriously expect that his or
her terror does indeed lead to an abolition of the state of Israel – in this sense, the
primary purpose that the organisation has deﬁned for itself is simply not feasible.
4But it can be interpreted as a justiﬁcation for a nihilist taste for producing damage
to a social organisation, in this case the state of Israel.
In a similar vein, Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, the leader of the terrorist
group that conducted the train bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004 has in his
suicide note not only referred to the participation of Spain in the invasion of Iraq
as justiﬁcation for the attacks, but he also referred to a restoration of Al Andalus,
i.e. of islamic rule over the Iberian Peninsula. A similar statement has been made
by the leadership of Al Qaeda shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001
(Wright 2004). Retaliation for an event that occured 512 years before the Madrid
bombing – the expulsion of muslim rulers from Spain in 1492 – and the obviously
non-feasible purpose to restore the situation before this event serve as a narrative
to justify the killing of 191 victims and the wounding of over 1800 individuals.
Another very disturbing account of nihilist motives in terrorism is to be found in
Laqueur (2003: 43-48) who reports on the plainly sadistic execution of terrorist
acts by muslim terrorist groups, whose members apparently enjoy a perverse utility
from the suffering of their victims.
These examples show that, besides the kind of terrorism that is used to serve fea-
sible purposes, there exists a kind of terrorism that aims not at achieving clear-cut
5political goals or at earning a private fortune through extortion. One of the assump-
tions made in this paper is therefore that there exists terror that aims only at threat-
ening given social orders without having the purpose to achieve any feasible polit-
ical goals. This hypothesis is losely connected to some of the psychological litera-
ture on terrorism. Ditzler (2003), recurring to Hoffman (1995), makes a distinction
between three types of terrorism. The ﬁrst is rational terrorism, where the notion of
rationality is much narrower compared to that of economics. It is meant to denote
the activity of terrorists who aim at achieving “constructive” goals, who recognize
trade-offs between the goals they attempt to achieve through terrorism and other ar-
guments in their utility function and who can therefore be reasonably targeted by
negotiations – put economically, these are terrorists who do not have lexicographic
preferences. The other two types, psychologically and culturally motivated terror-
ists are typically characterised by lexicographic preferences. These may for exam-
ple be psychologically disturbed individuals with an irrepressible want for revenge
or retaliation through terror, or individuals who believe that they have to defend or
expand their cultural worldviews by engaging in terrorism.
Pyszczynski et al. (2003, ch. 7) argue that terrorist activity often is not motivated
by a desire to reach any “constructive” goals, but much rather by a deep-seated
psychological want to annihilate those who do not share the cultural worldview
of the terrorist himself. In the case of islamic terrorism, the mere existence of
pluralist and secularist alternatives to a fundamentalist way of life is perceived to be
inacceptable: the jihad as a conquest of the dar al-harb, the non-muslim world, is a
6core motivation (Lincoln 2003). While such deep-seated psychological wants may
be quite widespread in a population, it is interesting to ask what turns a latent into
an actual terrorist. Sageman (2004), having studied the biographies of 171 jihadists,
argues that group bonds and close social ties within groups that eventually turn into
terror cells are an important factor.
Before the economic implications of a nihilist motivation for terrorism are explored
in the next section, it is important to note that, although at the moment islamic
terrorism appears to be a prominent example, it is certainly not a feature to be found
exclusively in islamic terrorism. The bombing of an ofﬁce building in Oklahoma
City in 1995 or the series of mail bombs sent by the so-called Unabomber are other
recent examples for a nihilist motivation in terrorism. Thus, culturally motivated
terrorism does also not necessarily need to have religious roots. On the contrary,
completely secular political belief systems may also serve as a motivation.
3. ON THE DIFFICULTIES OF APPEASING A NIHILIST
3.1. The economics of carrots in anti-terrorism policy. Frey (2004) argues
that an effective anti-terrorism policy can be designed around the idea of playing
a positive-sum game. According to this approach, policy ought to be designed
such that it leads to a pareto-superior situation compared to the status quo – i.e.,
it has to produce welfare gains for terrorists as well as for those who suffer from
terrorist attacks. A pure deterrence strategy with the intent to increase the welfare
of (potential) terror victims at the expense of terrorists does obviously not meet
7this requirement. Playing a positive-sum game with terrorists clearly implies a
voluntary exchange between two parties: a society that is harmed by terror offers
to exchange resources in order to gain peace and a terrorist offers peace in order
to gain resources to which he or she has not had access before. This exchange
does not necessarily need to take the form of an explicit contract, which would
introduce new problems of surveillance and enforcement. Frey and Luechinger
(2002, 2003) instead propose the more elegant solution to set incentives in the form
of rising opportunity costs of terrorist activity. According to this reasoning, making
alternatives to terrorist careers more attractive will automatically lead individuals
who ponder on the allocation of their resources to invest more of them into other
activities and less into pursuing terrorism.
From this perspective, it is reasonable that anti-terrorist policies simply ought to ex-
ploit this substitution effect in order to reduce terrorist activity. This can for exam-
ple be achieved on a broad scale by investing into foreign aid in order to increase
the income that can be achieved in peaceful occupations, or in a more targeted fash-
ion by offering alternative careers to terrorists, i.e. by increasing the attraction of
exiting a terrorist organisation and returning to civil society. In a similar vein, Frey
and Luechinger propose to open the process of political participation to terrorists in
order to increase their potential to pursue their goals through non-violent activities
and reduce their attraction to violence.
These proposals provoke some obvious objections. For example, an extension of
the simple model to multiple periods and individuals leads directly to the problem
8that in the longer run, increasing the opportunity costs of terrorism may be under-
stood as an indirect reward for terrorist activity. If Palestinian terror is rewarded not
only with international sympathy for the Palestinian cause, but also answered with
foreign aid in order to increase the opportunity costs of terror to Palestinians, this
terrorist strategy may easily become a blueprint for separatist movements around
the world – even if raising the opportunity costs should prove to be a successful
strategy to reduce Palestinian terrorism, which, given the empirical evidence on the
relative income status of terrorists (Krueger and Maleckova 2004), appears to be
doubtful. On the contrary, the argument can be made quite convincingly that in the
Palestinian case, the attempt to enter a positive sum game has encouraged terrorism
(Dershowitz 2002). The relevant question is thus: Why does the substitution effect
fail at least in some instances when the opportunity costs of terror are increased?
3.2. A ﬁrst choice: becoming a terrorist or remaining peaceful. An important
ﬁrst step towards understanding why appeasement may fail is to make a distinction
between two very different choices. The decision if one wants to become a terrorist
or remain a member of civil society is essentially not the result of a marginal cal-
culus, but a binary choice. This is particularly obvious for suicide bombers: either
the expected utility from producing a disutility to others exceeds the expected util-
ity from leading a non-violent life or not, but it is impossible to substitute some ter-
rorism for some peaceful family life or vice versa. Although less extreme, the same
is normally true for non-suicidal terrorists. Being a terrorist and pursuing normal
9ways of earning and spending an income are usually mutually exclusive lifestyles
where marginal adjustments are difﬁcult to make.
For the extreme case of a lexicographic nihilist, it is obvious that she is non-
appeasable in the sense that she prefers a state of the world with lower utility for
her opponent to a state with higher utility for her opponent, regardless of the values
that the other arguments in her utility function such as normal consumption goods
or non-violent political participation take under these two states. Therefore, all
lexicographic nihilists necessarily become active terrorists – even if reputational
rewards for terrorism would take negative values, i.e. a negative reputation follows
from violent acts. This does also hint at the limited explanatory power of assuming
supreme values in the form of lexicographic preferences, such as a lexicographic
preference for doing harm to other individuals. The only means of preventing a
lexicographic nihilist from doing harm is to lock him away. It is, however, not
necessary to assume such an extreme preference ordering in order to explain the
choice of becoming a terrorist.
Suppose that an individual’s utility function takes the following general form
u = u(y,uO,ρ,ϑ) (1)
where y is the own household income, uO is the utility of the opponent, ρ is earthly
reputation and ϑ is an ethereal reward that an individual may believe to gain in
exchange for mundane sacriﬁces. Clearly, a lexicographic nihilist who does not
aim at raising y through terrorist activities (e.g. through extortion), who is not
10interested in his reputation and who only wants to do harm to his opponent, even
negative values of ρ and/or ϑ cannot deter him from diminishing uO to a target
level u∗
O. The level u∗
O to which any single terrorist can depreciate the utility of her
victims does, on the other hand, depend on the resources made available to her by a
network of supporters who are not active terrorists themselves. This target level is
taken as exogeneous for now, but will be more closely considered in the following
subsection. Suppose further that a non-violent career allows earning an income ¯ y
while the household of an active terrorist lives on an income y. Then, while a rise
of ¯ y would ceteris paribus imply that a career in terrorism becomes less attractive,
for a lexicographic nihilist it will still be the case that
u(¯ y,uO,0,0) < u(y,u
∗
O,ρ,ϑ) (2)
as long as uO > u∗
O, i.e. even while increasing the opportunity costs of a terrorist
career makes a peaceful life marginally more attractive, a lexicographic nihilist is
unappeasable.
A moderate nihilist can be assumed to be distinguished from a lexicographic
nihilist by having a normal, continuous and differentiable utility function with the
twist that her utility declines if uO rises. This does, however, only slightly alter
the binary choice of a moderate compared to a lexicographic nihilist. A moderate
nihilist compares the two states of the world and enters a terrorist career if the
non-pecuniary rewards are sufﬁciently high to make sacriﬁcing a civilian income ¯ y
and diminishing uO his preferred choice. The moderate nihilist may be appeased
by raising his civilian income to a high enough level relative to his income as
11a terrorist – but the necessary amount may be very high if the non-pecuniary
rewards for being a terrorist are signiﬁcant. Therefore, the introduction of supreme
values (i.e. of lexicographic preferences) by Bernholz (2004) is not a necessary
condition to explain a decision of individuals to become a terrorist or even a suicide
bomber. Moderate nihilists react to pecuniary and to non-pecuniary incentives, but
marginally raising the opportunity costs of terrorism may not be sufﬁcient to alter
the binary choices made by these individuals. In other words, there is a range of
parameter values for which even potential terrorists with non-lexicographic, but
malevolent preferences are non-appeasable with small changes of the opportunity
costs of a terrorist career.
3.3. A second choice: supporting terrorism. Terrorist organisations do often
rely on the support of individuals who are not active terrorists themselves, but who
have sympathy for the goals of these organisations and who supply resources to
them and thereby enable them to pursue a full-time career in terrorism. So far,
the income y generated from a terrorist career and the target level u∗
O of terrorist
activities have been taken as given. It can, however, be reasonably assumed that
both depend on the magnitude of support that active terrorists enjoy from those
who are sympathetic with their activities. Suppose that, in the absence of a system
that formally enforces the payment of taxes among the supporters of terrorism, u∗
0
depends on the amount of voluntary contributions from these individuals. In plain
words, the level of harm that can be done to the victims of terrorism by any single
active terrorist rises with voluntary contributions by supporters of terrorism. This
12assumption can be motivated quite easily and appears to be reasonably realistic.
An active terrorist with a relatively large amount of resources at her disposal will
naturally be able to buy relatively more effective weaponry, invest relatively more
into collecting information about targets where she can produce a larger damage
and so on.
Some of the standard results from the literature on voluntary contributions to
public goods inform us that the aggregate level of contributions remains constant if
wealth or income is redistributed within a ﬁxed population of contributors in a zero
sum fashion (see Bergstrom et al. 1986), but that an increase of overall wealth or
income of this population will increase both the consumption of private goods and
the aggregate voluntary contributions to the public good. Increasing the wealth of
a population of supporters of terrorism (i.e., of individuals who have moderately
nihilist preferences, but who do not choose to become active terrorists themselves)
will thus, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase of resources that are made available
to active terrorists. One can of course think of further effects of a wealth increase:
For example, reciprocally minded individuals might react by feeling indebted to
the donor who is responsible for their increase in wealth.
There are two fundamental objections that can be made against reasoning within
such a simple model of reciprocity when the subject is nihilist terrorism. The ﬁrst
objection concerns the explicitly nihilist argument in the utility function of support-
ers of terrorism. If we are prepared to accept that such an argument exists in the
preferences of a group of individuals, then a change of preferences (a reduction of
13the nihilist propensity) would be necessary in order to overcompensate the increase
of support for terrorism that results from an increase of wealth. But achieving
a change of preferences is most likely much more ambitious than establishing
cooperative behaviour of rational, but mutually disinterested individuals. In a
framework in which nihilist preferences exist, it is therefore very unlikely that a
contribution of a potential victim of terrorism to an increase of the wealth of a
group of potential supporters of terrorism could actually reduce the aggregate level
of support for terrorism by evoking adherence to Axelrodian tit-for-tat strategies –
especially since the potential supporter of terrorism is in the role of a last mover
and her individual decision to contribute to terrorism or not is hardly observable to
the donor who is responsible for her increase in wealth (see also Hirshleifer 1987
for the role of malevolent last movers).
The second objection is concerned with the economic logic of reciprocity itself.
A point frequently made in theoretical reasoning on reciprocity is that not only
the resulting distributions matter if one wants to evoke complaisant behaviour of
an adversary, but also the intentions behind the strategy choices (see Rabin 1993
and the recent generalisation to sequential games by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
2004). If cooperative behaviour – abstaining from supporting terrorism at the nor-
mal utility-maximising level – is to be achieved, it is important that the perceived
motivation of a wealth transfer from potential victims to potential supporters of
terrorism is pure kindness. If, on the other hand, the recipients of a wealth transfer
perceive it to be the donor’s intention that he attempts to bribe them into reducing
14their support for terrorism, no cooperative behaviour can be expected as a response.
The wealth transfer is then not interpreted as an act of kindness, but rather as an
instrument used by a self-interested donor to increase his net welfare by reducing
his exposure to terrorist threats. Thus, even if the problem of a necessary change
of nihilist preferences did not exist, there would still be the obstacle that a wealth
transfer to a population containing supporters of terrorism must be understood as
an honest act of kindness in order to reduce their support of active terrorists.
Giventheseconsiderations, itappearstobealikelyoutcomeofawealthtransfertoa
population containing supporters of terrorism that the amount of support granted to
active terrorists does in fact rise. This, however, has repercussions on the decision to
become an active terrorist sketched in the preceding subsection. Depending on how
the additional means that are now supplied to active terrorists are used, either u∗
O
can be lowered (terrorism becomes more efﬁcient, i.e. more severe and harmful for
the victims) or y, the household income attainable by active terrorists may rise. The
former obviously renders all forms of active terrorism, conventional and suicide
attacks, more attractive in the binary choice (2). The latter has the same effect
for conventional terrorism, and it may also help to increase active participation in
suicide attacks if the attackers themselves are altruistic towards other members of
their households and believe they can increase their wealth through participation in
suicidalterroristattacks. Anexampleforsuchanincentiveisthefactthattheregime
of Saddam Hussein regularly awarded substantial grants to families of Palestinian
suicide bombers.
15In any case, given only moderately nihilist preferences and the resulting likely fail-
ure to evoke a complaisant reciprocal reaction through wealth transfers, it can be
expected that such transfers actually lead to an increase of terrorism. This increase
may manifest itself both in an increased severity of terrorism, due to the additional
recources made available to active terrorists, and also in an increased frequency of
terrorist attacks, due to the fact that the career option of becoming an active terror-
ist becomes more attractive and more individuals may be lured into giving up their
civilian lifestyles.
4. DETERRENCE AND RECIPROCITY IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERROR
The discussion so far has indicated that wealth transfers (e.g. through foreign
aid) are likely not to be suitable instruments to reduce terrorist activity if the
population receiving these transfers comprehends individuals that have nihilist
preferences. Contrary to the argument made by Bernholz (2004), it has been
shown that moderate nihilism sufﬁces to make this argument and that lexicographic
preferences are not necessary to explain even suicidal terrorism. It would be an
obvious reaction to this argument to endorse a strict deterrence-based approach
to ﬁght terrorism. Bernholz, for example, argues that depriving terrorists of their
resources is the only reliable means of reducing terrorist activity. However, it has
to be noted that such an approach has its own shortcomings which must not be
ignored.
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to the difﬁculty that positive wealth transfers cannot be targeted only to those indi-
viduals with rationally disinterested preferences. However, this difﬁculty to iden-
tify the voluntary supporters of active terrorists also implies that a broad-based re-
duction of resources available to terrorists would require that the entire population
is deprived of its resources. This raises the obvious normative objection that, if one
is committed to normative individualism, one can hardly justify to reduce, as a col-
letaral damage, the welfare of individuals who do not support terrorism (see also
Franck et al. (2004) for a formal treatment of such a moral dilemma). But it also
raises the problem that such a strategy is not a prudent anti-terrorsm policy if it pro-
vokes reciprocal reactions within the affected population.
Even if attempts to evoke a complaisant reciprocal reaction from individuals with
nihilist preferences by increasing their wealth are futile, it is still possible that they
are willing to retaliate against attempts to deprive them of their wealth – in other
words, there may be an asymmetry between a willingness to concede and a will-
ingness to retaliate in responding to actions of an opponent, an asymmetry between
positive and negative reciprocity. While the general existence of both types of reci-
procity is empirically well documented (Fehr and G¨ achter 1998, 2000), the speciﬁc
framework sketched here entails the problem that hostile acts can be easily identi-
ﬁed and evoke negative reciprocity immediately, while the motives behind kind acts
such as wealth transfers can be easily questioned in conﬂict situations of this kind.
Thus, even if positive reciprocity is likely to fail, negative reciprocity is likely to
17occur as a response to attempts of depriving a population containing supporters of
terrorism of their resources.
Measures of undifferentiated deterrence directed at an entire population of actual
and latent supporters of terrorism do therefore yield ambiguous results. While
withdrawing (by force) the resources available to a population with a positive
share of supporters of terrorism certainly reduces the overall potential for terrorism
support, this may through a negatively reciprocal reaction be overcompensated by
an increase of individual voluntary contributions to active terrorists. Even if this is
not the case and the amount of resources available to active terrorists shrinks, the
value of the reputation parameter ρ in (2) can be expected to increase, which can
overcompensate an increase of u∗
O and induce more individuals to become active
terrorists. This tendency is supported by the fact that undifferentiated deterrence
of this kind not only reduces y, but also the civilian income ¯ y. Such an increase of
the number of active terrorists with a simultaneous decline of material resources
available to them does likely imply a shift to a different type of terror, away from
elaborated large-scale attacks and towards an intifada-style threat. In this sense,
undifferentiated deterrence is counter-productive.
However, if neither deterrence of this kind nor appeasement are reasonable strate-
gies in a campaign against terrorism, then of what kind are the alternatives? Sage-
man (2004) points out with regard to islamic terrorism that there is a pool of indi-
viduals who took part in terrorist training camps, but who then decided not to be-
come an active part of terror cells. He argues that these individuals ought to be not
18a target of prosecution, but should rather be pursuaded to inﬁltrate terror cells as
agents of western intelligence. This hints towards the fact that a highly specialised
and very targeted form of deterrence, aimed only at active terrorists and conducted
by intelligence services rather than with the use of military force, is a third possi-
ble option as an anti-terrorism policy. It has the virtue that it provokes negatively
reciprocal reactions not within an entire population hosting some supporters of ter-
rorism, but only from those who sympathise with active terrorists - i.e., only from
those who have nihilist preferences. If conducted properly, such an approach gen-
erates the information necessary to frustrate attempted terrorist attacks, as well as
to retaliate against active terrorists, but leaves the sentiments of all individuals with
standard, rationally disinterested preferences unchanged.
5. CONCLUSIONS
It has been argued in this paper that two measures proposed in the economic
literature for a campaign against terrorism – undifferentiated deterrence and ap-
peasement – may have the unfortunate effect that they actually increase the level
of terrorist activities instead of decreasing it, under the assumptions that i) some
people have nihilist preferences, ii) the decision to become an active terrorist is
different from the decision to support active terrorists and iii) individuals tend to
reciprocate. The result is, of course, somewhat discouraging: There is no silver
bullet to put an end to terrorism and all measures proposed have some deﬁciencies.
This is certainly also true for the third possible strategy proposed at the end of the
19preceding section, but its deﬁciencies lie beyond the scope of the framework that
has been used here.
Furthermore, the framework used for discussion here is limited to cases in which
nihilist preferences are a widespread phenomenon in a population, so that voluntary
support of active terrorists by civilians matters. However, there are cases conceiv-
able where such widespread nihilist preferences do not exist, but where only an au-
tocratic regime with such preferences channels resources into terrorism. Whether a
regime change through military force would be instrumental for a decrease of ter-
rorist activity is clearly a question that cannot be answered within the framework
sketched here.
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